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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-2-2(3)(j). 
V. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are: 
1. Does the factual issue of whether the Mower/Lynn 
Transportation agreement (hereinafter "Mower/Lynn Agreement") is an 
integrated contract present genuine issues of material fact 
requiring a reversal and setting aside of the summary judgment? 
2. Could a fact finder construe the contemporaneously 
executed insurance order form and Mower/Lynn Agreement as one 
contract requiring reversal of the summary judgment? 
3. Does the parol evidence rule bar a contemporaneously 
executed insurance order form setting forth how Worker's 
Compensation would be obtained when the simultaneously executed 
written contract is silent on the issue and does not set forth or 
require a specific method for obtaining the Worker's Compensation 
insurance coverage? 
4. Was the parol evidence rule correctly applied to bar 
Mower's claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation and 
breach of contract against Lynn Transportation Co., Inc. 
1 
(hereinafter "Lynn" or "Lynn Transportation") and Alexander & 
Alexander (hereinafter "A&A")? 
5. Are the appellees estopped from denying their 
obligation to purchase Worker's Compensation insurance for Mower 
or, in the alternative, to notify him that they were unable to do 
so? 
6. Even if a written integrated contract exists between 
Lynn and Mower requiring Mower to obtain Worker's Compensation 
coverage, does that bar Mower's claims against A&A for its failure 
to provide the ordered Worker's Compensation insurance coverage or, 
in the alternative, inform Mower that A&A could not obtain the 
coverage? 
7. Did Mower fail to provide the notice required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (3) (a) , and if not, does the failure 
preclude Mower from suing the appellees for failure to provide the 
ordered Worker's Compensation insurance or, in the alternative, 
notify Mower that they could not obtain the insurance? 
8. Does the Mower/Lynn Agreement entitle Lynn to 
recover its attorney's fees and costs? 
9. Is Lynn Transportation equitably estopped from 
obtaining attorney's fees under its contract with Mower? 
10. Are there material issues of fact which require 
reversal of the summary judgment? 
2 
Each of the foregoing issues were raised in the memoranda 
supporting and opposing the parties' motions for summary judgment 
(R. 172-187, 192-276, 395-446, 465-489, 565-570, 633-635). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. And in deciding whether 
the trial court properly granted summary judgment, this Court 
reviews the decision for correctness without any deference to the 
trial court. E.g., CECO Corporation v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 
772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989). Further, whether the lower court 
correctly determined that the contract at issue was an integrated 
contract is reviewed for correctness, as is the question of whether 
the lower court correctly applied the parol evidence rule. Union 
Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972). In addition, whether written 
documents merged to form one contract is a question of fact and, on 
an appeal of a summary judgment, the lower court's conclusion is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard. Bullfrog Marina, 
supra at 270. Whether Mower complied with Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
43(3)(a), and if not, whether the failure bars Mower's claims, are 
issues of statutory construction reviewed under a correctness 
standard. See, generally. Surety Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 259 
U.A.R. 9, 10 (Utah 1995); Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 
3 
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989); Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services, 
813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H 
Insurance Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649-50 (Utah 1986). Moreover, whether 
Lynn was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to the contract at 
issue is a question of contract construction and is reviewed for 
correctness. E.g., Scudder v. Kennecott Corp., 858 P.2d 1005 (Utah 
App. 1993); Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 492, 
493 (Utah App. 1991). 
Finally, whether material fact issues exist is reviewed 
de novo, and on review, the appellant is entitled to have all of 
the facts presented and all of the inferences fairly arising 
therefrom considered in a light most favorable to him. Geneva Pipe 
Co., supra. 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
A determinative rule is U.R.C.P. 56, a copy of which is 
set forth in the Addendum to this Brief. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, 
and Disposition of the Lower Court 
This is an appeal from two summary judgments. One 
judgment dismissed Keith H. Mower's ("Mower's") claims against Lynn 
Transportation Co., Inc. and Alexander & Alexander, Inc. for breach 
4 
of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation and fraud (R. 
565-570). 
The other judgment awarded Lynn Transportation $34,398.52 
in attorney's fees and costs as a result of the lower court's 
interpretation of a contractual indemnification provision (R. 633-
635) . 
B. Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented 
For Review 
On appeal, Mower is entitled to have all of the facts 
presented and all of the inferences fairly arising therefrom 
considered in a light most favorable to him. Wineaar v. Froerer 
Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). Viewed in that light, the 
facts are as follows: 
Lynn Transportation is an Iowa trucking company doing 
business in Utah (R. 177, 297-298, 333, 435). It employs its own 
drivers and also contracts with independent owner/operators to 
transport Lynn Transportation loads (R. 297, 299, 435-436). 
Up until late 1989, Mower worked as a Lynn employee truck 
driver (R. 435-436). In April of 1990, Mower toyed with the idea 
of buying his own semi-truck/tractor, and toward that end, 
purchased one from Great Basin GMC (R. 436). 
Following the purchase of his truck, Mower requested that 
his former employer allow him to drive for it as an owner/operator 
(R. 436). On April 12, 1990, Mower met with two company employees 
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— Comptroller Susan Archibeque and office worker Linda Murray (R. 
423). Archibeque presented the form contract, a copy of which is 
attached in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit 4 (R. 173, 181, 424). 
The contract required Mower to obtain "Bobtail" and "Liability" 
insurance coverage for liability and property damage. The contract 
also required Mower to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance (R. 
172, 181). Paragraph 9(b) of the Agreement states: 
The Contractor [Mower] shall obtain and 
maintain in force and effect Workmen's 
Compensation insurance . . . covering itself, 
its drivers, driver's helpers and laborers 
employed by it . . . . (R. 181, 416) 
In addition, the same paragraph contains the following 
indemnification language: 
Contractor [Mower] agrees to . . . indemnify 
and Carrier [Lynn Transportation] harmless 
from and against any claims, loss or damage 
brought or alleged by Contractor or its 
employees against Carrier [Lynn 
Transportation] for any injury, including 
death, to Contractor or its employees 
resulting from the performance of this 
agreement. (R. 181, 416, 598) 
After presenting the form contract to Mower, Susan 
directed him to Linda and her cubicle to discuss insurance. Both 
Susan and Linda told Mower that Lynn Transportation could obtain 
insurance for him cheaper than he could obtain it for himself (R. 
427, 466). Linda presented an insurance order form (copy attached 
in the Addendum as Exhibit 5) prepared and given to her by A&A (R. 
396, 418, 477). A&A is a Maryland or Oklahoma corporation 
authorized to do business in Utah as an insurance brokerage (R. 
297-298, 318, 337). It obtains insurance for its clients, 
including Lynn Transportation (R. 299, 318, 334, 467). However, it 
has no offices in Utah. Instead, it provided insurance order forms 
to Lynn Transportation for use by Lynn's employees and independent 
contractors. It provided the insurance order form at issue (R. 
178, 183, 299, 336, 467-468). A&A's order form contains the 
following language: 
COVERAGE DESIRED: Bobtail Physical 
Damage Worker's Compensation . 
(R. 183) 
In her deposition, Linda testified she told Mower that he 
had to fill out the form to obtain insurance: 
Q: Did you tell him that that form had 
to be filled out for him to get 
insurance? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you understood that form was 
going to be used to obtain insurance 
for him? 
A: Yes. 
(Deposition of Linda Murray, 3-23-92, p. 13; R. 420.) 
Mower checked all three insurance blanks, requested 
Bobtail, Physical Damage and Worker's Compensation insurance 
coverage, and signed the A&A order form (R. 173, 178, 183, 300, 
396, 425, 465). Mower described his subsequent conversation with 
Linda as follows: 
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A: She looked at Exhibit 4 [A&A's 
insurance order form]. And she 
says: You want us to provide 
you with W o r k m e n ' s 
Compensation? And I said: 
Yes. And she said: Workmen's 
Compensation, you are not 
considered an employee of the 
company. Lynn Transportation 
pays for the Workmen's 
Compensation insurance for our 
drivers and for our employees. 
You would have to be added to 
this policy, and you would be 
expected to pay the difference 
between what the policy premium 
is this month and what the 
policy premium is next month, 
you know, with you being added 
onto it. And she says: It's 
liable to be expensive. Do you 
still want it? I says: As 
long as the company is taking 
out my insurance, it would be 
easier for me if all the 
insurance was handled through 
the company where I don't have 
to fool with it and make checks 
for it and stuff when I'm home. 
(Deposition of Kirk Mower, 7-21-92, p. 113; R. 432, hereinafter 
"Mower•s Depo., R. ".) 
Mower further explained: 
Q: When Linda told you that she 
would have to add a rider to 
get you Worker's Compensation 
. . . what did you say? 
A: . . . Let's get it handled. 
(Mower's Depo. at 42 6-427.) 
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Mower summarized the five-minute conversation as follows: 
"This is what I want." "You've got it. Go see Susan." (Mower's 
Depo., R. 434.) Whereupon he did. 
Susan asked Mower if he understood the written contract 
provided to him before he was directed to meet with Linda. Mower 
replied that he did and signed it (R. 177, 182, 425). That same 
day, Linda faxed the insurance order form to A&A (R. 306, 320, 376, 
396, 420, 468) . 
The order form ordering Worker's Compensation insurance 
was received by A&A from Lynn Transportation with the Worker's 
Compensation box checked. (Id.) 
In summary, the insurance form was completed at the same 
time as the written contract and as part of the hiring process. 
The insurance form and contract with Lynn Transportation were 
signed contemporaneously and as part of the transaction wherein 
Mower became employed as an independent contractor of Lynn 
Transportation (R. 172, 177, 178, 298-300, 465-66). 
According to Mower, Lynn Transportation represented that 
it would send in the order form and that A&A would compute Mower's 
premiums (R. 178, 188-89, 300-01, 466-67). 
Lynn Transportation told Mower that money would be 
deducted from payments due to him for insurance ordered from A&A 
(R. 173, 178, 301, 466). Lynn Transportation, in fact, deducted 
money to pay for "insurance" (R. 173, 178, 301, 400, 466). 
9 
Mower reasonably believed that he had purchased Workers 
Compensation insurance (R. 173-74, 178, 188-89, 302, 467). At no 
time did Lynn Transportation or A&A inform Mr. Mower that: 
(a) He could not purchase Worker's Compensation 
insurance from A&A; 
(b) Worker's Compensation insurance had not been put in 
force; 
(c) Additional information was needed to put Worker's 
Compensation insurance in force; 
(d) Money was not being withheld to pay for Worker's 
Compensation insurance, or that the money held out for insurance 
did not purchase Worker's Compensation insurance (R. 173, 175, 178, 
465, 466). 
A&A never notified Mower that: 
(a) It did not sell Worker's Compensation insurance; 
(b) It was not going to obtain Worker's Compensation 
insurance for appellant; 
(c) It could not, or would not, obtain coverage for 
appellant (R. 173, 175, 178, 468). 
Mower was specifically told by Lynn Transportation 
employees that: 
(a) He could obtain all necessary insurance through Lynn 
Transportation and that their insurance agent, A&A, and Lynn 
Transportation would pay for the same with payroll deductions 
10 
(Affidavits of Kirk Mower dated 12/3/91 and 11/5/92; R. 178, 300-
04, 465); 
(b) Worker's Compensation was available through Lynn 
Transportation (R. 178, 301, 466); 
(c) He could order all necessary insurance through Lynn 
Transportation's agent, A&A (R. 178, 301, 466); and 
(d) Insurance ordered on the insurance form provided by 
Lynn Transportation as to Mr. Mower would be ordered and he would 
pay for the insurance through payroll deductions (R. 301, 304, 
466) . 
Appellant was a novice in purchasing insurance, and 
reasonably relied upon A&A and Lynn Transportation to provide him 
Worker's Compensation insurance or notify him that they could not 
obtain the insurance for him. Lynn Transportation knew that Mower 
was driving the truck and that Mower was relying on it to obtain 
Worker's Compensation insurance for him (R. 188-89, 302, 468). 
On or about July 28, 1990, Mower was injured in an 
accident while driving his tractor-trailer and hauling a load of 
potatoes for Lynn Transportation. As a result of the accident, 
Mower's back has been fused and he is permanently disabled (R. 178, 
302, 590, 622). 
Subsequent to the accident, Mower learned for the first 
time that he was not covered by Worker's Compensation (R. 302). 
Since part of his medical expenses were paid by the Utah Department 
11 
of Human Services under Medicaid, it has been joined as a party 
plaintiff in this action (R. 297-310). 
Mower sued Lynn Transportation and A&A for breach of 
contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation and fraud (R. 2-
16) . Mower claimed that Lynn Transportation and A&A should have 
provided him the ordered Worker's Compensation insurance or 
informed him that they could not get it. Had Mower known that he 
did not have Worker's Compensation insurance coverage, he would not 
have driven his truck for Lynn Transportation (R. 178, 302). 
Claims for fraud and negligence are both fact-intensive. Thus, 
summary judgment is rarely granted. Early on in the litigation, 
A&A identified the following factual issues requiring a trial: 
1. Whether the form is an order form for Worker's 
Compensation and whether it was a contract, or whether it was 
provided as a courtesy service to Lynn Transportation contractors 
(R. 196). 
2. The scope and nature of the insurance coverage 
offered by Lynn Transportation and A&A and ordered by Mower is in 
dispute (R. 197). 
3. Whether Mower's belief that he had Worker's 
Compensation was reasonable (R. 198). 
However, the factual issues identified by A&A did not 
prevent Lynn Transportation and A&A from subsequently moving for 
summary judgment (R. 447-50). In support of their motion, they 
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presented two arguments. First, they said that, "All of Mower's 
theories of liability are in direct conflict with the express terms 
of Mower's contract with Lynn." More specifically, they said that 
(1) the contract required Mower to obtain Worker's Compensation; 
(2) estoppel was inapplicable because the court cannot rewrite and 
integrate a contract; (3) the parol evidence rule excluded the 
representations made by Lynn's employees and the insurance order 
form; and (4) Mower could not have reasonably relied upon the 
employees' representations. The second ground for the summary 
judgment was that Mower had not provided the notice required by 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-l-43(3) (a) so he could not have been damaged by 
Lynn Transportation's and A&A's failure to obtain Worker's 
Compensation insurance coverage for him (R. 395-446). 
The lower court determined that, "The contract between 
Lynn Transportation and . . . Mower . . . is an integrated 
contract, and the parol evidence rule therefore bars evidence of 
prior contemporaneous representations to vary the terms of the 
contract." (R. 565-66.) The lower court then said: 
It is undisputed that the form . . . was 
signed prior to the time Mower signed the 
written contract . . . . The contract 
unambiguously assigned the responsibility to 
obtain Worker's Compensation to . . . Mower 
(R. 566-67). 
Based on the foregoing, the court concluded: 
There is no genuine issue of material fact 
that the written contract controls and the 
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duty to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance 
rests with plaintiff Mower and not defendants 
[Lynn Transportation and A&A]. (R. 567) 
The court also said that Mower had not given the notice 
required by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(a), so "there is therefore 
no genuine issue of material fact from which a fact finder could 
conclude that the failure to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance 
. . . resulted in any damage . . . ." (R. 567.) 
Thereafter, Lynn Transportation moved for summary 
judgment on an indemnification clause. Specifically, Lynn 
Transportation said that it was entitled to attorney's fees and 
court costs because Mower's claims arose from the performance of 
his contract with Lynn (R. 595-607, 621, 624). 
In response, Mower explained that the indemnification 
clause did not apply because, "The claims of Mower did not arise 
from the performance of the contract . . . ." (R. 618) The court 
rejected Mower's argument and entered summary judgment for 
attorney's fees and costs on July 13, 1994 (R. 633-35). Mower 
timely appealed both Orders on August 5, 1994 (R. 63 6-37). 
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VIII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Whether the Mower/Lynn Written 
Agreement Is An Integrated 
Contract Presents Genuine Issues of 
Material Fact Requiring Reversal 
of the Summary Judgment, 
Whether a written agreement is an integrated contract is 
a question of fact requiring reversal of the summary judgment. 
See, e.g. , Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 
1972) . Further, before the issue of integration can be resolved, 
the fact finder must resolve the following three genuine issues of 
material fact: (1) whether the parties intended the insurance 
order form and Mower/Lynn Agrfeement to be construed as one contract 
(see Bullfrog Marina, supra at 270) ; (2) whether Mower would have 
signed the Mower/Lynn Agreement if he had known that the insurance 
order form would not be construed as part of the contract (see 
Id.) ; and (3) whether misrepresentations were made to induce Mower 
to sign the Mower/Lynn Agreement. See Union Bank v. Svenson. 707 
P. 2d 663, 666 (Utah 1995). Since the lower court was presented 
with the foregoing genuine issues of material fact, the lower 
court's summary judgment is inappropriate and must be reversed. 
See, generally, e.g., Jackson v. Righter, 259 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1995). 
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POINT II 
The Lower Court's Misapplication 
of the Parol Evidence 
Rule Does Not Justify the 
Lower Court's Summary Judgment. 
The lower court's application of the parol evidence rule 
does not justify the summary judgment for the following reasons: 
(1) as set forth in Point I, genuine issues of material fact must 
be resolved before the parol evidence rule can be applied; (2) the 
parol evidence rule does not bar Mower's claims against A&A because 
A&A was not a party to the so-called integrated contract; (3) the 
parol evidence rule does not bar claims for misrepresentation; (4) 
the parol evidence rule does not bar negligence claims; and (5) the 
representations made by Lynn's employees and the A&A order form 
were not offered to vary the terms of the Mower/Lynn Agreement. 
Since the misapplication of the parol evidence rule was the basis 
for the lower court's summary judgment, the summary judgment must 
be reversed. 
POINT III 
Whether Lynn Transportation Is Estopped 
From Denying Its Promise to Obtain 
Worker's Compensation For Mower 
Creates Genuine Issues of Material 
Fact Requiring Reversal of the Summary Judgment. 
Promissory estoppel relates primarily to those informal 
contracts which lack consideration but where, because of facts 
surrounding the transaction, injustice can only be avoided by 
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enforcing the promise. Easton v. Wycoff. 4 Utah 2d 386, 388, 295 
P.2d 332 (1956). 
Application of the doctrine creates the following genuine 
issues of material fact, each warranting a reversal of the summary 
judgment: (1) whether Lynn Transportation made a representation or 
omission; (2) whether Mower reasonably and justifiably relied on 
Lynn's representations, acts or omissions; and (3) whether Mower 
changed his position to his detriment based on his reliance. Since 
summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact, the lower court's summary judgments must 
be reversed. 
POINT IV 
Utah Code Ann. S35-1-43(3)(a) Does 
Not Bar Mower From Seeking Damages 
Against Lynn Transportation 
and A&A For Their Failure to 
Provide the Ordered Worker's Compensation 
Insurance Coverage Or Their 
Failure to Notify Mower That 
They Could Not Obtain the Coverage. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43 defines the terms "employee11, 
"worker", "workman" and "operator." It allows sole proprietors to 
elect to include themselves as an employee under the Worker's 
Compensation Act by giving notice to the Industrial Commission and 
the sole proprietor's insurance carrier. Notice statutes such as 
§35-1-43 do not provide a defense to an insurance carrier seeking 
to deny coverage. See Garrett v. Garrett, 249 S.E.2d 808 (N. C. 
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App. 1978). It follows that notice statutes such as §35-1-43 are 
no defense for an insurance brokerage such as A&A or a contractor 
such as Lynn Transportation for failing to obtain the ordered 
Worker's Compensation insurance coverage, nor could it be. Mower 
could not provide the statutory notice to his insurance carrier 
until A&A and Lynn provided him an insurance carrier to notify. 
POINT V 
The Lower Court Misconstrued the Mower/Lynn 
Agreement When It Awarded Lynn 
Transportation Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
When the indemnification clause at issue is strictly 
construed, it becomes obvious that Mower's negligence and breach of 
an oral contract claims do not result from the performance of the 
Mower/Lynn written Agreement. Since the indemnification clause at 
issue does not apply to Mower's claims, the summary judgment 
awarding costs and attorney's fees pursuant to the indemnification 
clause must be vacated. 
POINT VI 
Lynn Transportation is Estopped 
From Seeking Indemnification 
(Attorney's Fees) Under the 
Mower/Lynn Agreement. 
One of Mower's defenses to Lynn Transportation's claim 
for attorney's fees under the Mower/Lynn Agreement is the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel requires three factual 
elements: (1) a representation, act or omission; (2) justifiable 
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reliance; and (3) a change of position to one's detriment based on 
the reliance, Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust, 754 P.2d 1222, 1225 
(Utah 1988); United American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First 
National Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1982). As set forth in the 
Statement of the Case section of this Brief, the record shows that 
each of the foregoing factual elements is present and/or disputed 
in this case. Thus, the existence of these genuine issues of 
material fact requires a reversal of the summary judgment awarding 
attorneyfs fees and costs under the Mower/Lynn Agreement. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Whether the Mower/Lynn Written 
Agreement Is An Integrated 
Contract Presents Genuine Issues of 
Material Fact Reguiring Reversal 
of the Summary Judgment. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
As set forth in the Statement of the Case section of this 
Brief, Lynn and A&A obtained a summary judgment by arguing to the 
lower court that the Mower/Lynn Agreement was an integrated 
contract justifying application of the parol evidence rule to bar 
all of Mower's fact-sensitive claims. Mower contended that the 
contract was not integrated; that the parties intended the 
insurance order form to be construed with the Mower/Lynn Agreement; 
and that the representations made by Lynn's employees to induce 
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Mower to sign the contract all created genuine issues of material 
fact as to whether the parties intended the Mower/Lynn Agreement as 
a final expression of their agreement. The lower court found that 
the Mower/Lynn Agreement was an integrated contract, but it did not 
consider the insurance order form or the representations of Lynnfs 
employees in arriving at its conclusion (R. 565-570). 
B. Standard of Review 
Whether the Mower/Lynn Agreement is a complete integrated 
contract is a question of fact. E.g., Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 
P.2d 663, 665, 666-67 (Utah 1985); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 
501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972). Whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
is reviewed de novo, and on review, Mower is entitled to have all 
of the facts presented and all of the inferences fairly arising 
therefrom considered in a light most favorable to him. E.g. , 
Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Insurance Co. , 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 
1986). 
C. Legal Analysis 
Whenever, as in this case, a litigant insists that a 
writing before the court is an integration, and asks for the 
application of the parol evidence rule, the court must determine as 
a question of fact whether the parties did, in fact, adopt a 
particular writing or writings as the final and complete expression 
of their bargain. Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz. 28 Utah 2d 261, 
501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972). In resolving this genuine issue of 
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material fact, parol evidence is admissible. Union Bank v. 
Swenson, 701 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). 
Additional genuine issues of material fact occur when, as 
in this case, one party contends that two simultaneously executed 
writings (the insurance order form and the Mower/Lynn Agreement) 
should be construed together, and the other party contends that 
only the last signed document was the agreement. See Bullfrog 
Marina, supra at 270-71, wherein the court stated: 
In the instant action, the trial court found 
after full consideration of the entire 
transaction, including the purpose to be 
served by the lease and the employment 
contract, defendant would not have leased the 
boats to plaintiff unless he could operate the 
houseboat rental service. 
* * * 
The trial court did not err in following the 
rule of law that when two or more instruments 
are executed by the same parties 
contemporaneously or at different times in the 
course of the same transaction, and concern 
the same subject matter, they will be read and 
construed together . . . . 
Similarly, in this case, a fact finder could, and should, 
find that the contemporaneously executed insurance order form and 
the Mower/Lynn Agreement were part of the same transaction and 
concern the same subject matter (Worker's Compensation insurance). 
This genuine issue of material fact requires reversal of the 
summary judgment. See Bullfrog Marina, supra. 
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Another genuine issue of material fact was created by the 
Lynn employees' representations that they would order and obtain 
Worker's Compensation for Mower through A&A. These representations 
show that the Mower/Lynn Agreement was not intended to be a final 
integration. Moreover, Mower's Affidavit alleges that he would not 
have operated the truck under the Mower/Lynn Agreement without the 
misrepresentations (R. 487) . These allegations raise issues of 
material fact requiring reversal of the summary judgment. See 
Union Bank v. Swenson, supra at 666. 
POINT II 
The Lower Court's Misapplication 
of the Parol Evidence 
Rule Does Not Justify the 
Lower Court's Summary Judgment. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
Mower sued Lynn Transportation and A&A for their failure 
to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance coverage for Mower or to 
notify him that they could not obtain the coverage. Mower alleged 
claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud and 
breach of contract (R. 297-310). As set forth in the Statement of 
the Case section of this Brief, Lynn's employees told Mower that 
they could obtain Worker's Compensation cheaper than he could and 
that Worker's Compensation insurance premiums could be deducted 
from Lynn settlement checks to Mower. They also provided him with 
A&A's order form — a form supplied by A&A to Lynn to be used by 
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Lynn's employees and independent contractors. Insurance premiums 
were deducted from Mower's checks. No one from Lynn or A&A told 
Mower that he did not have Worker's Compensation insurance coverage 
or that A&A and Lynn could not obtain Worker's Compensation 
insurance coverage for him. Mower reasonably believed that Lynn 
and A&A had secured the Worker's Compensation insurance coverage. 
Had he known differently, he would not have driven the truck until 
coverage was secured (R. 487). 
Despite all of that, the lower court granted summary 
judgment dismissing the foregoing fact-sensitive claims. The Court 
first found that the Mower/Lynn Agreement was an integrated 
contract, and then reasoned that since it is undisputed that Mower 
signed A&A's insurance order form just before he signed the 
Mower/Lynn Agreement, "There is no genuine issue of material fact 
that controlled and the duty to obtain Worker's Compensation 
insurance rested on Mower and not Lynn or A&A" (R. 567). 
B. Standard of Review 
Whether the lower court correctly applied the parol 
evidence rule is viewed for correctness with no deference to the 
trial court. Bullfrog Marina, supra: Union Bank, supra. 
C. Legal Analysis 
1. Introduction 
The parol evidence rule has a narrow application. The 
rule operates in the absence of fraud only to exclude 
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contemporaneous statements or representations offered for the 
purpose of varying the terms of an integrated contract. Union 
Bank, supra at 665. As hereinafter set forth, there are numerous 
reasons why the parol evidence rule does not justify the lower 
court's summary judgment. 
2. Whether the Mower/Lynn Agreement Is An Integrated 
Contract Is a Factual Issue Which Creates Genuine Issues 
of Material Fact, So the Court Should Not Have Applied 
the Parol Evidence Rule. 
The Court may apply the parol evidence rule only when 
there is an integrated contract. Bullfrog, supra at 270. It 
cannot be applied when there is a dispute over whether the 
agreement is an integrated contract. Union Bank, supra at 666-668. 
As set forth in Point I of the Argument section of this Brief, 
whether the Mower/Lynn Agreement is an integrated contract is a 
question of fact, and there are numerous genuine issues of material 
fact that must be determined to resolve this ultimate fact issue. 
Thus, the Court should not have applied the parol evidence rule. 
The court's premature application of the rule requires a reversal 
of the lower court's summary judgment. Union Bank, supra. 
3. The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Bar Mower's Claims 
Against A&A Because A&A Was Not a Party to the Mower/Lynn 
Agreement. 
The parol evidence rule applies only to those who are 
parties to the written contract. E.g., Kimmel v. Iowa Realty Co., 
339 N.W.2d 374, 381 (Iowa 1983); Denha v. Jacob, 446 N.W.2d 303, 
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306 (Mich. App. 1989); Sullivan v. Estate of J. C. Eason, 558 So.2d 
830, 832 (Miss. 1990) . Since A&A was not a party to the Mower/Lynn 
Agreement, the parol evidence rule cannot possibly bar Mower's 
claims for negligence and breach of contract (order form) against 
A&A. Thus, that part of the summary judgment dismissing Mower's 
claims against A&A must be reversed. 
4. The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Bar Claims for Fraud 
And/Or Negligent Misrepresentation. 
The parol evidence rule operates "in the absence of 
fraud." Bullfrog Marina, supra at 270 (emphasis added). It does 
not bar a claim for fraud. Union Bank, supra at 665; see Berkeley 
Bank For Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (1981). Nor does it 
bar a plaintiff from showing that misrepresentations were made 
either intentionally or negligently which caused the innocent party 
to sign the agreement. See Union Bank, supra at 666. 
In this case, there is evidence that Lynn Transportation 
misrepresented to Mower that it would obtain Worker's Compensation 
for Mower and that Mower could pay for it by deductions from his 
settlement checks; that Mower reasonably relied on the 
misrepresentation and was induced by the misrepresentation to sign 
the contract; that Mower's belief was reasonable; and that as a 
result of his reliance on the misrepresentations, he was damaged. 
Since the record factually establishes a prima facie case of fraud 
and/or negligent misrepresentation, the lower court should not have 
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applied the parol evidence rule to bar these claims. Since the 
erroneous application of the parol evidence rule was the primary 
basis for the lower court's summary judgment, the summary judgment 
should be reversed. 
5. The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Apply to Negligence 
Claims. 
The parol evidence rule is a narrow principle of contract 
interpretation. Union Bank, supra at 665. It is applied to 
contract claims. Restatement Contracts (Second) §213. It is 
codified in Utah's Uniform Commercial Code. See Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-2-202. However, it has no application to torts. See 9 
Wigmore, Evidence §§2401, 2404 (Chadborne Rev. 1981) (rule applies 
to jural acts). 
Mower is clearly entitled to recover for the negligence 
of Lynn Transportation and A&A in failing to effect Worker's 
Compensation coverage for Mower. E.g., Fiorentino v. The Travelers 
Insurance Co. , 448 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1978); State Farm 
Insurance Co. v. Fort Wayne National Bank, 474 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. 
App. 1985) ; Connell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 482 
So.2d 1165 (Ala. 1985); Zitelman v. Metropolitan Insurance Agency, 
482 A.2d 426 (D.C. App. 1984); Hunter v. State of Florida, 391 
So.2d 234 (Fla. App. 1981); Clary Insurance Agency v. Doyle, 620 
P.2d 194 (Alaska 1980); Stuart v. National Indemnity Co., 7 Ohio 
App.3d 63, 454 N.E.2d 158 (1982). 
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To recover, Mower must show: 
(1) Negligence in the representation of the type or 
extent of coverage to be obtained; 
(2) Reliance on the agent's representation in ordering 
insurance; 
(3) Loss as a result of misrepresentation; and 
(4) Justifiable reliance on misrepresentation. See 
Fiorentino, supra at 1369. 
Since the parol evidence rule does not bar a negligence 
claim, and since a factual dispute exists as to all of the above 
elements, the summary judgment must be reversed. 
6. The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Bar Contemporaneous 
Representations Or Writings When They Are Not Offered to 
Vary the Terms of the Contract. 
In this case, the representations made by Lynn's 
employees and the insurance order form were not offered to vary the 
terms of the Mower/Lynn Agreement. The Agreement does not specify 
how Mower is to obtain the Worker's Compensation insurance required 
by the Agreement. It is silent on the issue. Thus, the 
representations and insurance order form should have been allowed 
to show how Mower was to obtain the Worker's Compensation 
insurance. 
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POINT III 
Whether Lvnn Transportation Is Estopped 
From Denying Its Promise to Obtain 
Worker's Compensation for Mower Creates 
Genuine Issues of Material Fact 
Requiring Reversal of the Summary Judgment. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
In responding to Lynn Transportation's and A&A's motion for 
summary judgment, Mower said that Lynn Transportation was estopped 
from denying its promise to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance 
for Mower. As set forth in the Statement of the Case section of 
this Brief, Lynn's employees told Mower that they could purchase 
all of the necessary insurance for him, provided him the insurance 
order form submitted to them by A&A, and told Mower that his 
Worker's Compensation premium would be deducted from his settlement 
checks. Mower and an insurance expert both said that Mower had 
reasonably relied on the foregoing promises and was induced not to 
obtain Worker's Compensation insurance in some other way, all to 
his detriment (R. 188-91). The lower court did not specifically 
address the promissory estoppel issue in its Order granting summary 
judgment. 
B. Standard of Review 
Whether the lower court correctly applied or failed to 
apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel is reviewed for 
correctness. See Petty v. Gindv Manufacturing Corp., 404 P.2d 30, 
33 (Utah 1965). 
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C. Legal Analysis 
Promissory estoppel relates primarily to those informal 
contracts which lack consideration but where, because of the facts 
surrounding the transaction, injustice can only be avoided by 
enforcing the promise. Easton v. Wycoff. 4 Utah 2d 386, 388, 295 
P.2d 332 (1956). Estoppel is invoked to prevent injustice when one 
has reasonably relied to his detriment on a representation or 
omission. See United American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First 
National Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1982). Generally, to invoke 
the doctrine requires the presence of three factual elements: (1) 
a representation, act or omission; (2) justifiable reliance; and 
(3) a change of position to one's detriment based on the reliance. 
These are factual issues. See Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust, 754 
P.2d 1222, 1224-25 (Utah 1988). 
The case law is clear in holding that where an insurance 
broker or agent agrees to procure a policy under circumstances 
which would lead an applicant to believe that insurance has been 
obtained, the law requires the agent to perform the duty 
undertaken. State Farm Insurance Co. v. Fort Wavne National Bank, 
474 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. App. 1985); Sheridan v. Greenberg, 391 So.2d 
234 (Fla. App. 1981) ; Stuart v. National Indemnity Co. , 7 Ohio 
App.3d 63, 454 N.E.2d 158 (1982). 
Since the decision of whether to apply the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel in this case to prevent Lynn Transportation 
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from denying its promise to obtain Worker's Compensation for Mower 
creates the foregoing genuine issues of material fact, the summary 
judgment must be reversed. 
POINT IV 
Utah Code Ann. S35-1-43(3)(a) Does 
Not Bar Mower From Seeking Damages 
Against Lynn Transportation 
and A&A For Their Failure to 
Provide the Ordered Worker's Compensation 
Insurance Coverage Or Their 
Failure to Notify Mower That 
They Could Not Obtain the Coverage. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
Under the Mower/Lynn Agreement, Mower agreed to obtain 
Worker's Compensation insurance covering himself and his employees. 
Under the A&A order form, Mower ordered Worker's Compensation for 
himself and his employees from A&A. Neither Lynn Transportation 
nor A&A ordered the Worker's Compensation insurance or notified 
Mower that they could not obtain the Worker's Compensation 
insurance for him. 
In its summary judgment Order, the lower court found as 
a fact that Mower did not notify the insurance carrier or the 
Industrial Commission, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
43(3)(a). From the foregoing, the Court concluded that Mower could 
not be damaged by Lynn Transportation's and A&A's failure to obtain 
the ordered Worker's Compensation insurance or, in the alternative, 
their failure to notify Mower that they could not obtain the 
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insurance. The record shows no legal support for the lower court's 
novel construction of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(a). 
B. Standard of Review 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's interpretation 
of a statute on a correctness of error basis without deference. 
Surety Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 259 U.A.R. 9, 10 (Utah 1995); 
Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989); 
Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services, 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
C. Legal Analysis 
Section 35-1-43 defines the terms "employee", "worker", 
"workmen" and "operator" as used in this [Worker's Compensation] 
statute. Subsection (3)(a) provides that a "sole proprietorship 
may elect to include as an employee under this chapter . . . the 
owner of the sole proprietorship." If the sole proprietor makes 
the election, it is directed to serve notice of it upon its 
insurance carrier and upon the Industrial Commission. No sole 
proprietor is considered an employee under the Worker's 
Compensation statute until the notice has been given. The statute 
does not specifically preclude a sole proprietor from obtaining 
Worker's Compensation insurance or suing those who have agreed to 
provide Worker's Compensation insurance, but then failed to do so, 
nor could it. Mower could not possibly notify his insurance 
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carrier, as required by §35-1-43(3)(a), until his brokers, Lynn and 
A&A, provided Mower an insurance carrier. 
In addition, Mower is not seeking damages for any right 
or privilege granted under Utah's Worker's Compensation statute. 
Thus, whether he is considered an employee under the statute is 
immaterial. What Mower is seeking are damages that are proximately 
caused by Lynn's and A&A's negligent failure to provide the 
insurance that would cover him in the event of a worker accident, 
and their failure to notify him that they could not obtain the 
coverage. Mower also seeks the same damages under a breach of 
contract claim. 
Moreover, there are no reported cases wherein an 
insurance broker like A&A or a contracting party like Lynn has 
attempted to use a statutory notification provision as a defense 
for a failure to provide the insurance coverage. However, in 
Garrett v. Garrett, 249 S.E.2d 808 (N. C. App. 1978), the North 
Carolina Appeals Court held that an insurance carrier was estopped 
from using a similar notice statute as a defense to a demand for 
Worker's Compensation insurance coverage. Simply put, coverage 
does not depend upon compliance with the notice statute, but on the 
terms of the policy itself. 
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POINT V 
The Lower Court Misconstrued 
the Mower/Lynn Agreement When 
It Awarded Lynn Transportation 
Attorney's Fees and Costs* 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
The indemnification clause at issue reads: 
[Mower] agrees to indemnify [Lynn 
Transportation] from and against any claims, 
loss or damage . • . for any injury . . . to 
[Mower] resulting from performance of this 
agreement. 
Lynn Transportation argued that the foregoing requires Mower to pay 
Lynn's attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against 
Mower's claims (R. 598-607). Mower responded that his claims did 
not arise from the performance of the Mower/Lynn Agreement, and 
that instead, the claims resulted from Lynn's negligent failure to 
obtain Worker's Compensation insurance coverage and from its breach 
of an oral agreement (R. 617-620) . The lower court ruled that the 
foregoing indemnification clause required Mower to pay Lynn's 
attorney's fees and costs (R. 633-35). 
B. Standard of Review 
Whether the terms of an indemnification agreement are 
ambiguous and whether the trial court properly interpreted an 
indemnification agreement are legal conclusions reviewed for 
correctness. Scudder v. Kennecott Corp.. 858 P. 2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 
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App. 1993); Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 492, 
493 (Utah App. 1991). 
C. Legal Analysis 
The law is clear that indemnification agreements are 
strictly construed against the drafter. Freund v. Utah Power & 
Light Co. , 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990); Scudder v. Kennecott 
Corp., 858 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah App. 1993). This is particularly 
so when, as in this case, the negligent party attempts to shift the 
financial responsibility for its own negligence. Pickhover v. 
Smith Management Corp. . Ill P. 2d 664 (Utah App. 1989). In this 
case, there is a factual presumption against an intent to indemnify 
unless it is clearly and unequivocally expressed. Gordon v. CRS 
Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991). 
Indemnification is not achieved by inference or implication from 
general language. Pickhover, supra at 667. The indemnification 
provision at issue specifically requires Mower to indemnify Lynn 
only when the claim, loss, damage or injury "results from the 
performance of this agreement." 
However, the claims, injury and damage set forth in 
Mower's Complaint did not arise from the performance of the 
Mower/Lynn Agreement. The claims arose out of Lynn's negligent 
failure to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance or to notify 
Mower that it could not do so. The claims also arose from a 
separate oral agreement or promise to purchase the Worker's 
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Compensation insurance for Mower. Thus, the indemnification 
language does not apply in a summary judgment awarding attorney's 
fees and costs under the indemnification clause, and must be 
vacated• 
POINT VI 
Lynn Transportation Is Estopped From 
Seeking Indemnification (Attorney's 
Fees) Under the Mower/Lynn Agreement. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
After Lynn Transportation obtained a summary judgment 
dismissing Mower's claims, it moved for an order granting summary 
judgment on the issue of attorney's fees. Lynn said that the 
following paragraph entitled him to fees: 
[Mower] agrees to indemnify [Lynn 
Transportation] from and against any claims, 
loss or damage . . . for any injury . . . to 
[Mower] resulting from performance of this 
agreement. 
In response, Mower replied that Lynn was equitably 
estopped from enforcing the contract provisions. More 
specifically, Mower said that Lynn made the following 
misrepresentations and/or omissions: (1) Lynn Transportation would 
obtain Worker's Compensation for Mower and allow Mower to pay for 
the premiums with deductions from his settlement checks; (2) it 
ordered the insurance from A&A for Mower; (3) Lynn Transportation 
deducted insurance premiums from Mower's checks; (4) Lynn 
Transportation never told Mower that it had not purchased Worker's 
35 
Compensation insurance or that it was not able to obtain Worker's 
Compensation insurance for Mower; and (5) Lynn never required 
additional proof of Worker's Compensation coverage from Mower. The 
record also shows that Mower reasonably relied on the foregoing 
representations and omissions (R. 188-89). In addition, there is 
no factual dispute that Mower changed his position to his detriment 
based on the reliance; that is, had he not reasonably relied on 
Lynn's representations and omissions, he would have purchased 
Worker's Compensation from some other source before driving his 
truck. However, the lower court, in granting summary judgment, did 
not address the equitable estoppel issue. 
B. Standard of Review 
Whether the trial court properly applied or failed to 
apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel is reviewed de novo under 
a correctness standard. See Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust, 754 
P.2d 1222 (Utah 1988). 
C. Legal Analysis 
Equitable estoppel is invoked to prevent injustice when 
one has reasonably relied to his detriment on a negligent 
misrepresentation or omission. See United American Life Insurance 
Co. v. Zions First National Bank, supra; Celebrity Club, Inc. v. 
Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (1979). 
Equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting 
rights when another party has justifiably relied on the acts, 
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omissions, representations or statements of the party or changed 
positions so that he will suffer injury if the former party is 
allowed to repudiate his contract. Rothey. supra at 1224. Three 
elements must be present: (1) a representation, act or omission; 
(2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change of position to one's 
detriment based on the reliance. These are factual issues. Id. at 
1225; United American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First National 
Bank. 641 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1982). 
In the lower court, Lynn asserted that by his contract, 
Mower agreed to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance and to 
indemnify Lynn Transportation from all claims presented in this 
lawsuit. Mower responded that Lynn Transportation was equitably 
estopped to claim the benefits of the contract indemnification 
language. "The general rules of estoppel apply to the operation 
and effect of a contract of indemnity as between indemnitor and 
indemnitee." Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co. , 754 P.2d 1222, 
1224 (Utah 1988) . 
To invoke equitable estoppel, a party need only show 
conduct by another party which leads him, in reliance thereon, to 
adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the 
first party is allowed to repudiate its contract. E.g., United 
American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First National Bank. 641 P.2d 
158, 161 (Utah 1982); Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
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Commission. 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979); Mendez v. State Dept. of 
Social Services. 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991). 
In the present case, the facts and reasonable inferences 
set forth in the Statement of the Case and summarized in the 
Factual and Procedural Background set forth above show all of the 
elements of equitable estoppel. Clearly, Lynn Transportation was 
negligent in failing to obtain Worker's Compensation insurance for 
Mower. 
The facts show that Mower relied on a false, negligent 
representation by Lynn Transportation (that Worker's Compensation 
insurance would be obtained if Mower checked the box to order such 
coverage). Clearly, Mower relied on this promise. The promise 
turned out to be false. The fault for lack of coverage clearly 
lies with Lynn Transportation and A&A, whose negligence created a 
non-insured situation. Estoppel must be invoked herein to prevent 
a manifest injustice to Mower. Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, supra: Mendez v. State Dept. of Social 
Services. 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991); Eldredae v. Utah 
State Retirement Board. 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990). 
At a bare minimum, the issues of misrepresentation and 
reasonable reliance present genuine issues of material fact 
requiring reversal of the summary judgment awarding indemnification 
and attorney's fees. See Ward v. Richards & Rossano, Inc., 51 
Wash. App. 423, 754 P.2d 120, 127 (Wash. App. 1988); see also, 
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Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services, 813 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment dismissing Mower's breach of 
contract, negligence and fraud claims should be dismissed because: 
(1) whether the Mower/Lynn Agreement is an integrated contract 
presents numerous genuine issues of material fact; (2) the lower 
court's misapplication of the parol evidence rule does not justify 
the summary judgment; (3) whether the appellees are estopped from 
denying their promise to obtain Worker's Compensation for Mower 
creates genuine issues of material fact; and (4) Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-43(3)(a)'s notice provisions do not bar Mower's claims. 
The summary judgment awarding Lynn Transportation's costs 
and attorney's fees should be reversed because the lower court 
misconstrued the indemnification provision, and Lynn Transportation 
is estopped from seeking indemnification under the Mower/Lynn 
Agreement. ~ 
Respectfully submitted this % ( day of MdKCM . 1995. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
^ <£j4£^-
OteufyQeric 
KIRK H. MOWER and the -UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES," 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, an 
Oklahoma corporation qualified to do 
business in the State of Utah; and LYNN 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., an 
Ohio corporation, 
Defendants. 
LYNN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., 
Counterclaim-
plaintiff, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 910905824CV 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Hit copy 
vs. 
KIRK H. MOWER, 
Counterclaim-
defendant. 
This matter came before the Court on defendants* joint motion for summary judgment 
on December 4, 1992 at 9:30 a.m. In addition, defendant Lynn Transportation's motion to 
strike the affidavits of Jerry Anderegg, in which defendant Alexander & Alexander had 
joined, had been submitted to the Court for a decision. Based on the memoranda and other 
materials submitted by the parties, and the arguments of counsel, the Court rules as follows: 
1. The motion to strike the affidavits of Jeny Anderegg is granted for the reasons 
stated in defendant's motion. However, even if those affidavits were admitted, the 
undisputed facts would still mandate the following summary judgment. 
2. The Court determines that the contract between Lynn Transportation and 
plaintiff Mower attached as Exhibit "A* to plaintiffs complaint is an integrated contract, and 
that the parol evidence rule therefore bars evidence of prior or contemporaneous 
representations to vary the terms of that contract. The Court determines, pursuant to 4-
501(2)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, that it is undisputed that the form attached 
as Exhibit "B" to plaintiff Mower's Amended Complaint was signed prior to the time Mower 
signed the written contract with Lynn attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiffs complaint. The 
2*J76.l 2 
written contract identified as Exhibit "A * unambiguously assigned the responsibility to obtain 
worker's compensation insurance to plaintiff Mower. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue 
< ntract controls and the duty to obtain worker's 
compensation insurance rested with plaintiff Mower, and not defendants. 
3. lij iiiMiiiu , iiui i mil fetennines lhai if is undisputed that Mower was a sole 
proprietor of his business and that he failed to give notice either to the Industrial Commission 
or to any insurance carrier of his alleged desire i to himself co »/ered under any 
workers' compensation insurance policy. Thus, plaintiff Mower would not have been 
covered by a workers' compensation insurance policy even if defendants - for 
CTvr iiicfi notice to the Industrial Commission and the insurance 
carrier is imposed upon the sole proprietor. Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-43(3)(a). ['here is 
therefore no genuine a factfinder could conclude that 
defendants' alleged failure to obtain workers' compensation insurance for plaintiff resulted in 
any damage to plaintiff. 
:*0T6 1 3 
A pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court 
determines that the defendants Lynn Transportation and Alexander & Alexander are entitled 
to summary judgment in their aintiffc Mower and the Department of 
Human Services on all causes of action in plaintiffs amended complaint alleged against 
defendants. The Court hereby GRAJ> ;idgment 
SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ^4» day qf^  
BY THE C( 
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Tal 
JUL 13 m 
George W. Pratt (USB #2642) 
Andrew H. Stone (USB #4921) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Lynn Transportation Company, Inc. 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KIRK H. MOWER and the "UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES," 
: ORDER 
Plaintiffs, : 
: Civil No. 910905824CV 
vs. : 
: Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, an Oklahoma : 
corporation qualified to do business in the State : 
of Utah; and LYNN TRANSPORTATION : 
COMPANY, INC., an Ohio corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
LYNN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., 
Counterclaim-plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIRK H. MOWER, 
Counterclaim-defendant. 
By. 
Transportation Co., Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Honorable Ronald O. Hyde 
presided. Based upon the a * 
on file, the court GRANTS defendant's motion. 
Accordingl) , it is herebj 01 dei ed, a nd the clerk is • directed to prepare and e liter a 
Judgment, as follows: 
1 > Summary Jiul^nu'iil is gianied nil LMIII JYanspniuiinn's l;irsi Claim loi relief, 
in favor of Defendant Lynn Transportation and against plaintiff Kirk H. Mower, in the 
amount of ' rwenty-Six Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents, 
($32,526.83), based on the indemnity provision in the contract between Lynn Transportation 
and Kirk I I I\ lower, attached as Exhibit A to Mower's Complaint. 
2) In addition, Summary Judgment is granted on Lynn Transportation's Second 
Claim for relief, b favrr of DefendantT ~— Transportation and against plaintiff Kirk H. 
Mower, in the 
Cents, ($1,871.69), requiring a total Judgment on Lynn Transportation Co., Inc.'s First and 
Second Chiiits tor leiicl in die .muujnl oi Tinny F'Hir PIOUKJIKI, rim.r Hundred Ninety 
Eight Dollars and Fifty-Tu Cents ($34,398.52). 
89354.1 2 
3) Lynn Transportation's Third Claim for Relief is hereby ordered DISMISSED 
without prejudice. 
All amounts to bear interest at the statutory rate from the date of entry. 
So Ordered. / ^ ? ^f ^ 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Edward T. Welli" 
Attorney for Plaintiff Kirk H. Mower 
Attorney for Defendant Alexander & Alexander 
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Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 148 
scheduled appearance in another court on that from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
date, but due to fact that there were no law or ment, rather than from the date of judgment, 
motion days between time objection was filed Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re- 124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered & Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)). 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham- C l t e d i n U t a h S a n d & G r a v e l Prods. Corp. v. 
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
Time for appeal. J R W ' E n t e r s " I n c- v* Naef> 6 0 4 R 2 d 4 ^ 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal ( U t a h 1 9 7 9 ) > K a t z v- P i e r c e > 7 3 2 P-2d 92 (Utah 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 1255. 
§ V. l t -4 1 9 2 1 C 3 J .S . Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
 f
 Ff™ t0 *?* ™tice °ff W * » t i o n for de-
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to iia- fault J u d ^ ^ t where no ice is required only 
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment <$=» 92 to 134 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
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forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56. F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Compliance with rule. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Notice. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Guardianship. 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
—Note. 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
—Stock ownership. 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment proper. 
—Contract action. 
—Contract terms. 
—Deceit. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Negligence. 
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t ; wnenmewngintementtioa:. . ©nCARRiER $ trailers. CONTRACTOR than be responti*<t ; © C A A R I E * i0f damage.loss end/or melt of me : 
KiE* » equipment ano/or co*i t en»m pan* ceutrd by cereie»*nets.neo-gence.imB>»©B>er usage eno/ore.*wie ©I ee»d equipment, except »nme 
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0 To immediately ramose flit hrai to pr©*©nt irreparable damage and loss o( said Urea. 
t . To return CARRIER* equipment with aama tires thai woia mounted on said eovipment at time CONTRACTOR or its egentt took p o u e m t 
aame. In the evenl foreign t»ret are found on CARRIER a aoulpmenl. CONTRACTOR will a* Mid liable. 
d. To use CARRIER'! oqurpment only In (ho ordinary eovrta of CARRIER i business at a me>te>r common or contract caviar. 
In the event of aucn loas to the CARRER. the lost win ba deducted from CONTRACTORS eetUement. CARRIER will make amenable to CONTR 
TOR a wrliian explanation and itemization of any deducnoni for uamane to CARf..ER*e aqulpment prior to or •( the time such deductions u m i 
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and oblam authorisation prior to signing any delrvefy receipts or similar documents acknowledging the lossot. Shortages or damages to ct 
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14. The CARRIER may require CONTRACTOR to deposit with the CARRIER Five Hundred Dollars (1500.00) to be placed in an escrow fund. The ft 
that! be established by depositing 12S.00 per week from paymtnls due CONTRACTOR under this Agreement until auch limt at a loin of SSOC 
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of Tioasury. 
15. The CONTRACTOR agrees and ii is mutually understood thai if CONTRACTOR, or Its employees and/or agents used in the performance of r 
Agreement, shall collect any sums of money Irom customers on account of bills rendered to customers by CARRIER, during (he course 
CONTRACTOR s operations, it will no'd such money as a trustee for CARRIER and will hold it apart irom its own funds and will deliver such mor 
to CARRIER forthwith. 
16. This Agreement shall noi be construed at a restriction upon CONTRACTOR s right to engage in any other business it detir**. 
17. As required by 49 C F R.Part 1058. the CARRIER m i u provide identification required by governmental agencies to be alined io the £qwpment T 
CON 7 RACT fJR agrees that such identification m m be so allifod only gwnng the period of the Agreement and only when the equipment it eciut 
being used m the so*vice of the CARRIER ar.d rornoved from (he Equipmoni if and wnen it Is used m other service. The CONTRACT OR man ieit 
identification ic CARRIER upon termination of |h«s Agreement, (n tho event CONTRACTOR fails to return auCh idenillicat<f>n, t I0O 03 <*<" 0« <c 
lento by CONTRACTOR enu aoprornaio deduction made Irom CONTRACTOR s linal settlement 
16. In the eveni elm^r p*rty commut a material breach of any term of lh<i Agroemoni. tha other party t lul i have the right to terminate mis Agrecm#-
immediately md hold n»e party committing tne breien iiib'e lor dimages 
10 7 he CONTRACTOR s»»sii i n ' c u all diligent efforts io conduct Us operation under this Agreement to assure continued satisfaction of CARfUt'* 
Customers. 
20 Except lo Iht exlent otherwise- provided in Appendix 0 to this Agreement, mis Agreement shall continue m efloct for a poriod of thirty (30) diyt I'O-
the day and daie first above written said term to be automatically renewed lor successive thirty (30) day periods unless either party hereto snisi g.» 
to the other written nonce Of cancellation thirty (30) d#ys prior to the e*yira!ion of the initial term or any renewal theret<l. 
21. It. lor any reison. CONTRACTOR ma'f fail to complete transportation of commodities In transit or abandons a shipment or otherwise sutjec: 
CARRIER to labilities to shippers or governmental agencies on account of the acts or omissions of CONTRACTOR en route. CONTRACTOR •« 
pressiy agroes thai CARRIER siuil have mo right lo complete performance using trie same or olhor equipment, and hold CONTRACTOR ua&te >c 
th» ro*i thereof and for any other damages. CONTRACTOR hereby waives any recourse against CARRIER for aucn action end agrees to relmou'K 
•. •%.mifcruor any costs and e*pontes arising out of such completion of such trip, and lo pay to CARRIER any damages lor which CARRtER may o*. 
iiabiu <•< sniprar aritmg out of such breach of contract by CONTRACTOR. 
22. Tnit Ay.cement constitutes the entire Agreement and understanding beiwoen the parties and shall not be modified.altered, changed or amended ir 
any respect unless in writing and s>gned by both parties. 
23. The parties intend to create by this Agreement the relationship ol CARRIER and INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR and not an E M P U O Y E R - I UPi Or-
£E relationship. Neither the CONTRACTOR nor its employees are to be eonu'dered employees of the CARRIER at any time under any circuT>»ta'»Cci 
lor any purpose Neither pert is the agent of the olhei and neither party shall have the right to bind the other by contract or otherwit* except as i..v, »,r. 
epeeifieeUy nmvHind 
24. A wa'vorpy eitrier party at anytime o' any of the terms, conditions, or covenants ollhlt Agreoment. orofenydefeuiiorbreacnahaiinot bent urn to c 
taken as a waiver at anytime tnereatie' of the same or any other term, condition or covenant herein contained, nor of the strict and prompt perform-
ance thoroof 
Any term, condition or covenant harem contained that is held to be invalid by any court of competent lurisdletion mall be considered deleted lror~ 
thii Agreement, but such deletion snail in no wcy affect any other term, condition or covenant herein contained or the parties' obligation! wun 
respect meieto 
?S It is ig«eed met each and all of me ngnts. options or remedies undtt ihLr^gTAmeni are cumulative, and no one of m«m malt be exclusive o' the 
otner or exclusive 0' **f remedies 0'Ovtdtd by lew. and thai exercise of>6ne rigpi. option or remedy by either party shall not impair thai party • r.gMj 
IO my other rlgnt. option or remtCy. / 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parl.es hereio nave executed mis Agreernes/tnis f^ ^ ' S * ' oey of-
end »m« i nail Of coni id tied b<nd«ng upon bom parlies and snail remain IK/ull force %it a l i*<TuTT>p 11 and •tr,4,*'jwuelled accord»no I M m teimt o' in<» 
Agt«0int f l i 
CONTRA&^CR ' -
a 
*i< ^ ^ ' , "C (me -CONTRACTOR-). 
WITNESSED. .HAT. 
WHCRC AS me CARRIER, en I n i i ' i l i u For Mire U0 t0r C«*rt»r. operating under • Certificate Of Public Convenience end Necessity or Perm.. »u>*e c 
fry me i M . n i i u Commerce C»mm,M .on r iCC- ) . en* s»wr»went 10 • •empties Mom »ti«omt« regulation IPtCttieO in the Interstate Co«m»fci Act •>• 
f#flui|flO«« thereunder, withes 10 Obiem transportation througn »n agreement whh CONTRACTOR: and 
WHEREAS. CONTRACTOR Ii engaged m t f * business of trensperling freight by motor vehicle »f»d 
NOW. THEREFORE, in consideration of tht mutual covenants and agreements contelned heroin, tne p»rtl#» mutually agree ai follows: 
1 T M CONT RACTOR egren to « • • 'he equipment mon eoeclhcAlly doierl*ed In Appendix A to thti Agreement. »*d by reference made i p in heree' 
(Iht -eou.pm»nr). together with drivers end all olhtr labor CONTRACTOR deems appropriate to trenepoM.load end unload on btn*l<
 0t CARRIER 
• ' • « feeneif
 0t such other eerrt*real CARRIER may deiignale through eulhertiedTtrp Leeseor Interchange agreement!. iwCn commodities st me 
CARRIER may msfce available to the CONTRACTOR. The CARRIER egrees lo make commodities evaliebi* from tlmt to time tor tremportation by 
me CONT RACT OR. nowover. this shell not be construed es an egroomonl by the CARRIER to fumleh. nor lha CONTRACTOR to accept any ipaclf'C 
number of load! or pounds of Ireight for irantportttion at any perlicuftr time or any particular place. 
2. It (i understood *r\6 agreed mat me performance of thu Agreement, end tha relationship of the partial hereundor than be. (o (he extent (net they are 
applicable. In aeeordanee with th* requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act. and me rules and reputations of the ICC and the U.S. Department 
• f Transportation r O O T ) . at modified and amended from lime to time. 
3. The CONTRACTOR It hot obligated to purchase or rem any products, equipment, or services from the CARRIER as a condition to entering into this 
Agreement. 
4. For each trip made by the CONTRACTOR under the terms of mis Agreement, the CARRIER agrees, with such exceptions as agreed lo bsiwten 
CARRIER »^ CONTRACTOR, and specifically provided for on CARRIER'S prenumbered trip record Issued to CONTRACTOR or Its driver (or escn 
trip, lo pay CONTRACTOR according to the terms of the Schedule eel forth in Appendix B to this Agreement, which may be modified from time to 
lime by mutual agreement of me parties. 
This amount shall constitute lull.payment to CONTRACTOR, Including all payments for piek*ups. delivery and transportation between points o' 
origin »nd destination and all loading end unloading Any amounts overpaid by CARRIER for pickup, delivery, overcherge claims on previous leads 
and simitar items shall be deducted from this amount. The CARRIER wilt make available to CONTRACTOR for its examination, upon reasonable 
request, copies of its tariffs. 
5. As i9Q\jir»6 by i t C.F.R. f 1057.12(g). the CARRIER shell sortie with CONTRACTOR within IS days after the CONTRACTOR submits, by mall or in 
person, the neeessary delivery documents and other paperwork concerning a trip m the service of the CARRIER The reuuired documents snsti 
Include all signed delivery receipts, and related shipping documents. Including bills of lading driver's daily logs, mileage repens, vehicle inspection 
rtperti and such other evidence of proper delivery as may be reouired by the Rules and Regulations of the ICC or the OCT ft Is understood and 
agreed that alt of the aforementioned documents and/or related documents may contain information relating exclusively to CARRIER'S business 
and must not be released to any parties other man duly authorized CARRIER personnel. 
In eny case where the CONTRACTOR has secured sn advance of any kino from me CARRIER, or If mere shall be any other amounts Cut to me CAR-
RIER, or to initiates o» the CARRIER from the CONTRACTOR or CONTRACTORS authorized agents or employees, me CARRIER shall be 
authorized to deduct the amount of such advance or other emounts tio* to the CARRIER from tho CONTRACTOR in settling wim CONTRACTOR 
under the terms of the Agreement In aodiiion, me CARRIER shad hive a period of thirty (30) days alter termination of mis Agreement to verily the 
account of the CONTRACTOR as to money owed ma CONTRACTOR and to make appiopriate deductions before final settlement. 
6. The CONTRACTOR recognizes the CARRIER'S business of providing motor carrier transportation services to the public is subject to regulation by 
the Federal Government acting through the ICC and the DOT. and by ve> ./us state and local governments The CONTRACTOR snail hevi me 
responsibility ot 
a Maintaining o< causing me Equipment to be maintained In i? - state of i«p*»r itQuired by all applicable regulations; 
b. Operating me Equipment in accord witn a» applicable regulations: 
e. Utilizing oniy tnose drivers to operate the Equipment who are qualified u*6»r an applicable regulations: 
d. Doing all erne' things necessary to conduct me transportation services provided in this Agreement in accord with all sopiicsbie regulations. 
7. Tne CONTRACTOR snail determine me means and methods of the performance of all transportation services undenaken by me CONTRACTOR 
under this Agreement Tne CONTRACTOR has and shall retain all responiibihty lor: 
a. Hiring, letting the wages, hours and working conditions and ed|uit)ng l»io grievances of. Supervising, training, disciplining and tiring all driven, 
driver s helpers §r\cs other workers deemed necessary by CONTRACTOR for tne performance of Its obligetions under tne terms of mis 
Agreement. *Mcn drivers, drivers' helpers, and omer workers are and shall remain the employees of the CONTRACTOR. 
b Seteeting. purchasing or leasing, financing, and maintaining or causing the Eouipment to be maintained. 
C. Paying all operating expense Including, but not limited to, all eapenses of fuel lor Equipment, roed taxes, fuel er mileage taxes, fines to' perking. 
moving or weight violations (except that CARRIER shall be responsible for fines lor overweight and oversized iraiiert when treiierj' are pro* 
loaded, sealed, or the .load is containerized, and lor Improperly permitted ever.dimension loads, unless the violation results from me act or 
omission of the CONTRACTOR), empty mlieege. tolls, ferries, detention tnd accessorial services, or any other levies or assessments resulting 
from the performance of this Ayroemenl. 
d. Purchasing luel in the amount necessary to balanee luel taxes dueineaehstsie CONTRACTOR agrees lo keep and make available fueitickels. 
drivers records and other documents necessary for reporting purposes. CONTRACTOR further authorizes CARRIER lo deduct from each 
settlement the total amount necessary to compensate CARRIER for the amount It must pay for CONTRACTOR'S failure to bslsnce such luet 
purchases 
B. The CONTRACTOR has and shall retain sole financial responsibility for aft Federal highway use tasea. withholding and employment taxes tiv to 
Federal, state or local governments on account of drivers, drivers' helpers and other workers deemed necessary by CONTRACTOR lor the 
performance of its obligations vnatt the terms of this Agreement. Tne CONTRACTOR egrees lo save and hold harmless tne CAnniER front any 
etaims by drivers, drivers' helpers enc othor worker* used by the CONTRACTOR, or by any Federal, state or local governmental agency, on account 
ot wlmnoiomg and employment taxes, or m r ether actions arising from the CONTRACTOR'S relationship with its employees 
9. As reouired by 49 CFR |1D5?.12(k). responaibility for obtaining Insurence coverage shall be as toflows: 
a. The CARRIER shaft Obtain and maintain In force e.>d effeet during the entire term of thu Agreement Jneurance coverage for me protection or the 
public purmtrM to ICC regulations under 49 U.S.C. |10l27. 
b. The CONTRACTOR shall obtain end maintain in force and affect Workmen's Compensation Insurance (with Aft States Enso'iement) to me lull 
extent of staiutory limits of all states In which work will be perlormed pursuant to the terms of mis Agreement covering itieif. its drivers. driven* 
helpers and laborers employed by ft In me pertormence of this Agreement. and man lurniah CARRIER witn a cooy of policy evidencing iwcn 
coverage or a Certificate of fnsurance In lieu thereof. CONTRACTOR agrees to protect, defend, indemnify, and hold CARR«CR nsrmien Worn 
and agiinsl any claim, loss or damage brought or alleged by CONTRACTOR or its employees egalnst CARRIER lor any Injury. Including death. 
lo CONTRACTOR or Its employees resulting from the performenee of this Agreement. 
c Tne CONTRACTOR agrees lo obtain m d maintain in full force end affect during the entire period of this Agreement. Bobtail and Oeadhend 
Insurance Coverage with respect to public liability »r\6 property damage in me limits of $250,000 for »ny perton. $750,000 for any accident, and 
IS0.0O0 prooeily damage in any eecident concerning the Equipment end/Of CARRIER'S eouipment and egrees to furnish evidence o' SUCH 
coverage to C A R R I E R and arrange for CARRIER to be named es additional Insured under euch policy. 
/ v ^ ' 5 num O, r \ ) 3 0 v/nn.? wren—a^. 
ftSAK wicor Mcaurr, i r . » rr - / ..HP :.: -90 .:•::;* ^^ MCSMT. I T . » > - ^ ' • l^?r?50'5 P-V 
Tab 5 
{??&. u&7. 'Z/y^c/' frfy &JTT */-/3 •% 
C-- Alexander 
CALL IN INF0PKM10N TO MARY BACKEKSTOSE g ^ J 6 X a n Q 6 r 
IMMEDIATELY. THEN SENT A PHOTO £DFY OF 
COMPLETED FORM TO A&A INC. FOR OUR F I L E S . / 
, yiP-* ,EXH(WT _ 
LYNH TRANSPORTATION - SALT LAKE C I T Y * * W V~<r-'~(, 
OWNER/OPERATOR * & * * WKTOK WKGSMrr. » , C3*. W 
Effect ive Date of Coverage //sir// X3 /?W) 
Name of Owner/Operator K^//c / - / /?hi~£* 
Address 7 5 < T W ^<*.c, , (\^t 
CO. UNIT « YEAR MAKE SERIAL I VALUE 
2 . J 
LOSS PAYABLES: 
DRIVER INFORMATION 
tfce^el (&s on License) 
Address
 7 < C A ; rze«+r^sL 0.^ . (as an Lioense) 
Date of B i r th -7-3-yflr License I ! <rOL\ frC 
Social Securi ty <3£--£,3-V6-57 S t a t e of Issue u ^ u , 
FOR MY CONVBOINCE, I REQUEST THE ABOVE MOTOR CARRIER TO DEDUCT MONTHLY 
FROM SBTTUEKaOS DUE ME, ANY FREKIUMS I MAY OWE THE INSURANCE CARRIER 
AND RQ4IT THAT AMOUNT TO TOE AGENT AM) AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE. 
—"^Signature of Cfc?ner/Ope: Signed by the Safety Direc tor -^ "Signat r  f V r/Operator 
COVERAGE DESIRED: 0 0 1 2 
Bobtai l V Physical Damage Y Workers Compensation V 
E x h i b i t 2 
